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ABSTRACT
The United Kingdom faces demographic uncertainty, as
negotiations for leaving the European Union (Brexit) proceed.
Brexit has implications for international migration into and out of
the UK, dependent on future immigration policy and on how
attractive the UK will be as a labour market. At the same time, the
UK population is experiencing ethnic diversiﬁcation, consequent
on past immigration. To explore the UK’s future ethnic diversity,
we run four projection scenarios. Three international migration
scenarios, varying by the extent of the break with the EU, are
implemented together with a reference projection assuming zero
international migration. Ethnic groups are diﬀerently aﬀected by
these migration scenarios, depending on the contribution of
international migration to population growth and the extent of
demographic momentum. The White British and Irish lose
population under all Brexit scenarios and the Black Caribbean
population declines in all but one scenario. The White Other, Indian,
Chinese, Other Asian and Other groups will show much lower
growth under Soft and Hard Brexit scenarios. The growth of the
Mixed, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Other groups
will only be aﬀected marginally. Under every scenario, however, the
UK’s population is projected to continue to grow, age and diversify.
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Population projections are essential for the eﬀective planning of services and for under-
standing the impact that future population size and composition will have on society.
International migration is the most volatile and least predictable component, given that
it is inﬂuenced by economic conditions and policy decisions which are largely outside
the control of the migrant. International migration makes a substantial contribution to
population change in most developed countries. Varying the assumptions about future
rates or ﬂows of migration can have a sizeable impact on projection results. Variant pro-
jections are produced by statistical agencies around the world and are used by a wide range
of organisations including government, business, utility companies and public/private
health providers to plan for their service or product delivery. In an age where public
resources are ﬁnite and business needs to develop targeted marketing strategies, the
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ability to plan for a range of future population scenarios is essential. This paper presents a
range of projection scenarios for the United Kingdom (UK) by experimenting with
diﬀerent assumptions about future international migration, focussing on the sub-popu-
lations most aﬀected by international migration, ethnic groups.
Substantial changes to migration policy have impacted on international migration to
the UK in recent decades. In May 2004 ten countries joined the European Union (EU),
and the UK was one of only three countries to allow near-unrestricted access to its
labour market (Bauere et al. 2007). As a result, 2011 Census data reveal that 856,235
migrants from accession countries arrived between 2004 and 2011. Analysis of statistics
from the International Passenger Survey/Long Term International Migration (IPS/
LTIM) estimates produced by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS 2017a, 2017b)
shows that between 2012 and 2016, immigration to the UK by citizens of the EU
has grown signiﬁcantly while immigration by non-EU citizens has fallen substantially.
This fall in non-EU immigration reﬂects a policy of restrictive migration management
introduced by the UK Government in an attempt to achieve their target of reducing net
international migration below six ﬁgures (Sims 2016). These relatively recent changes
and their knock-on eﬀects demonstrate the need for projections which take into
account the impact that policy can have on international migration ﬂows and hence
future populations.
Further uncertainty about future international migration policy stems from the voters’
decision, following a referendum vote in June 2016, that the UK should leave the European
Union. The term Brexit has been adopted by UK and European leaders for the leaving
process. One key part of a Brexit agreement will be the rights of UK and EU citizens to
migrate between the UK and EU. At the time of writing, it is uncertain how liberal or
restrictive will be the policies adopted by the UK and the EU. Since the Referendum
result of June 2016, EU citizen immigration has fallen and emigration has risen (ONS
2017b), but the net balance is still positive.
Because demographic behaviour varies across sub-populations, national and subna-
tional projections are disaggregated by age and sex, with diﬀerent fertility, mortality,
internal and international migration rates used with each sub-group. These rates also
vary substantially by ethnic group, sub-populations distinguished by racial, national or
cultural attributes. Examples of ethnic group projections include the following: Frey
(2015) provided analysis of and projections for ethnic population change in the USA;
Coleman (2010) produced national ethnic group projections for the UK population;
Wohland et al. (2010), Rees et al. (2012), Rees et al. (2017) produced UK sub-national pro-
jections by ethnic group in two rounds based on the 2001 and 2011 Censuses; and Kupis-
zewski, Kupiszewska, and Brunarsksa (2017) produced ethnic population projections for
the Russian Federation. An ethnically disaggregated projection should perform better than
one which is only disaggregated by age and sex because additional ethnic heterogeneity is
taken into account within the model.
Many European national statistical agencies produce projections by foreign back-
ground (e.g. Statistics Netherlands 2018; Statistics Norway 2018). However, despite
important ethnic diﬀerences in demographic rates, there are few examples of oﬃcial pro-
jections by ethnic group, largely due to problems with data availability (Lanzieri 2011; Rees
et al. 2017). Notable exceptions include national and sub-national projections by race and
Hispanic origin produced by the US Census Bureau (Colby and Ortman 2015); national
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and sub-national projections for four overlapping ethnicities produced by Statistics New
Zealand (2017); national and provincial projections disaggregated by visible minority
groups carried out by Statistics Canada (Morency, Malenfan, and Mac Isaac 2017); and
an annual projection by ethnicity for London Boroughs by the Greater London Authority
(GLA 2016).
Ethnic group projections are needed because an understanding of the future size and
composition of national and sub-national populations by ethnicity is essential for ensur-
ing equality of opportunity and in reducing discrimination. They are required for
eﬀective planning, because ethnic groups have varying needs for health care (Parliamen-
tary Oﬃce of Science and Technology 2007), social care, particularly through the pro-
vision of informal care (Rees, Wohland, and Norman 2009) and education through
language provision (Penn 2000). These diﬀerences in service need are highlighted by a
recent comprehensive audit of all UK government data which diﬀerentiate by ethnic
group, undertaken by the Cabinet Oﬃce (2017). The audit reveals that disparities are
not uniform across all domains for all ethnicities. Chinese and Indian pupils perform
better than White British pupils at school; those from Black, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or
Mixed groups are more likely to be unemployed than the White British; while those
from the Asian, Black and Other ethnic groups were most likely to be living in persistent
poverty.
The GLA (2016) emphasise the importance of their projections by ethnicity for plan-
ning future service provision in London. We argue that similar data are needed for the
whole country. In this paper, we produce a series of population projections for the UK,
disaggregated by age, sex and ethnicity which take into account diﬀerent international
migration scenarios. While we have produced projections for all UK local authority
areas, we focus on the national picture in this paper: our intention is to demonstrate
how sensitive to international migration diﬀerent ethnic group populations are. Our
results can inform the debate on the implications of changing migration policy which is
not easily measured using more aggregate projections.
Review
Direct and indirect eﬀects of migration
International migration has both direct and indirect impacts on a country’s population
size and structure. Direct impact can be derived from the numbers of people who enter
the country through immigration or leave through emigration. The cumulative direct
impact is often quantiﬁed as a net eﬀect, although this masks the diﬀerences between
the composition of immigrant and emigrant groups. There is no such thing as a ‘net
migrant’ (Rogers 1990). Bouvier, Poston, and Zhai (1997) use simulations for the USA
and Germany to highlight the fallacy that assuming zero net international migration in
population projections is equivalent to no international migration because immigrants
diﬀer from emigrants in their demographic and ethnic composition.
Indirect impacts are cumulative over time, where the fertility, mortality and internal
migration behaviour of the population depend on its composition, which is inﬂuenced
substantially by international migration. Migration can alter the age structure of the popu-
lation because migrants tend to be younger than the host population (Gavrilov and
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Heuveline 2003). There is evidence that fertility rates vary by country of birth. Coleman
and Dubuc (2010) ﬁnd that, in the UK, foreign-born mothers have higher fertility than
UK-born mothers in the same ethnic group and similar evidence exists for the USA, Neth-
erlands, France and Sweden (Sobotka 2008). Most immigrant groups show higher levels of
child bearing shortly after migration (Andersson 2004) with a decrease over time
(Coleman and Dubuc 2010). Most international migrants who move for economic
reasons are self-selecting which leads to a ‘healthy migrant eﬀect’ (Razum, Zeeb, and Rohr-
mann 2000). However, this eﬀect decreases with the length of residence (Fennelly 2007).
Mortality rates vary between ethnic groups, although in the UK the rates must be
indirectly estimated (Rees, Wohland, and Norman 2009). There is limited evidence that
the internal migration rates of recent international migrants are diﬀerent from those of
established populations. Stillwell et al. (1999) identify a link between higher immigration
and higher internal out-migration in the UK, while Lomax et al. (2013) report that there is
a negative correlation between international and internal migration for sub-national areas
in the UK, with areas which gain immigrants losing internal migrants. The combined
direct and indirect impacts are often termed the total impact of migration (Bouvier,
Poston, and Zhai 1997).
Ethnic diﬀerences in demographic components
Alongside international migration, the other components of a population projection are
fertility, mortality and, for sub-national projections, internal migration. Norman, Rees,
and Wohland (2014) report diﬀerences in ethnic fertility in the UK where, compared
with a White British reference group, women from South Asian countries tend to have
relatively higher fertility, Chinese have relatively lower fertility and the pattern is more
varied for the Black groups. Diﬀerences are reported across other studies, e.g. Penn
(2000) reports on relatively high levels of fertility for Pakistani women in the UK and
Coleman and Dubuc (2010) report that Chinese and Indian women have lower fertility
than the UK average. Rees, Wohland, and Norman (2009) ﬁnd diﬀerences in ethnic mor-
tality, estimating that life expectancies are highest for the Chinese group, above average for
Other White and Other Ethnic groups, and lowest for the Bangladeshi, Pakistani and
Other Black groups. They also ﬁnd diﬀerences by sex, Indian women have below
average life expectancy while Black African men have above average life expectancy. Mor-
tality diﬀerences in the USA for ethnic groups born within and outside the country are
found by Singh and Siahpush (2002).
Internal migration redistributes populations within the country. This is important
because fertility and mortality vary between diﬀerent geographies (Rogers 2008) and
so spatial distributions can have an impact on overall population size. Using 2011 UK
Census data, Lomax (2015) reveal diﬀerences in migration rates by ethnic group. Pakis-
tani and Bangladesh groups are the least mobile and the White Other and Chinese
groups are most mobile. Simpson and Finney (2009) concentrate on spatial patterns
in Great Britain, arguing that prevailing notions of ‘self-segregation’, whereby a high
concentration of an ethnic group attracts other migrants of the same group, are no
longer true. Rather, using 2001 Census data, they ﬁnd ‘all ethnic groups except
Chinese have been migrating away from areas of minority ethnic concentration for
some time’ (ibid, 53).
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Scenario projections
A framework for testing the contribution of migration, fertility, mortality and age structure
in a projectionmodel was set out by Bongaarts and Bulateo (1999), who produced four pro-
jection variants for world regions. These variants were standard (all components); natural
change (zeromigration); replacement (by setting fertility to replacement levels and keeping
migration at zero); andmomentum (reﬂecting only the age structure). Thework reveals that
young age structures are themain driver of growth in all world regions except Europe, where
momentum is negative. Similar results are reported by Lutz, O’Neill, and Scherbov (2003)
who estimate momentum for EU countries, ﬁnding that it turned from positive to negative
in the year 2000. They describe a model with constant mortality and zero net migration
which would result in 88 million fewer people in the 15 EU countries by 2100. Bijak et al.
(2007) undertake scenario population projections for 27 European countries. Using consist-
ent fertility, mortality and economic activity assumptions, they test three migration scen-
arios (base, high and low) informed by the potential future policy change, as well as a
zero international migration scenario. Under all scenarios the population of Europe ages.
Wilson and Rees (2005) argue that in research on the impact of migration, there is little
concerned with projecting migration. Most studies focus on describing and explaining pat-
terns in the recent past. They point to the importance of gettingmigration ‘plausibly right’ in
a projectionmodel, as well as the need for projection results for groups beyond age and sex,
including ethnicity. For the UK, Rees, Wohland, and Norman (2013) produce hypothetical
projections based on an extended version of the Bongaarts and Bulateo (1999) framework
that adds internal migration. Crucially, Rees, Wohland, and Norman (2013) incorporate
ethnic diﬀerences and undertake analysis at local authority scale. Immigration was found
to have a positive impact on population size for virtually all combinations of ethnic
groups and sub-national areas, while the diﬀerences between population change for
groups and areas were due mainly to internal migration and momentum. Rees,
Wohland, and Norman (2013) highlighted the importance of international migration as
a driver of sub-national population change but did not go beyond a baseline and a zero
net migration scenario. Our work builds on this by speciﬁcally focussing on international
migration and providing scenarios in a framework of post-Brexit possibilities.
Data and methods
This section sets out the data used, the methodology for the cohort-component projection
model and the assumptions used in each of the scenario projections.
Projection model and components
Local Authority District (LAD) populations by age, sex and ethnicity are projected using
the ETHPOP bi-regional cohort-component model (speciﬁed in Rees et al. 2017). The
model applies ethnic-speciﬁc mortality rates by age and sex for sub-national areas to a
start of interval population. Births are generated by applying ethnic-speciﬁc fertility
rates to female populations by age. Immigration and emigration to/from LADs by age,
sex and ethnicity are input as ﬂows. Internal migration is generated by the application
of internal migration rates. Populations and components of change are disaggregated by
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single year of age up to 100+, two sexes and by 12 ethnic groups. The model uses a one-
year time interval and runs as a period-cohort projection.
Base period component estimates
First estimates of mortality rates by ethnicity are produced for the UK through summing
LAD mortality rates weighted by the ethnic share of the LAD population. These ﬁrst esti-
mates, in turn, are applied to each group in a LAD and adjusted to match registered total
deaths in 2011. Full details of this geographical distribution method are given in Rees,
Wohland, and Norman (2009).
Fertility rates by ethnicity are estimated by triangulating data from: the Labour Force
Survey (computing ethnic-speciﬁc fertility rates based on the ‘own-child method’) and
LAD level information from the 2011 Census (adjusting all woman Total Fertility Rates
using ethnic-speciﬁc child-woman ratios) and ONS data (all woman age-speciﬁc fertility
rates). Initial estimated rates are applied to women of child-bearing years by ethnic group
to output the number of births per group and then adjusted so that the number of births is
consistent with ethnic group populations aged 0 in the 2011 Census and the births in the
calendar year by LAD. (See supplemental online material SOM1 and Norman, Rees, and
Wohland (2014) for more details.)
Internal migration rates by ethnicity are estimated from special tabulations of inter-
LAD migration by ethnicity generated from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses. In- and out-
migration rates by ethnicity were interpolated between the two censuses and adjusted
to agree with ONS, National Records for Scotland (NRS) and Northern Ireland Statistics
and Research Agency (NISRA) internal migration ﬂows for all ethnic groups. See Rees
et al. (2017) for a description.
Estimates of immigration and emigration for the base year, mid-2010 to mid-2011, were
developed using the International Passenger Survey (IPS) (ONS 2018c). The IPS is a
survey of 300,000 interviews with people who make trips into and out of the UK,
though only 1–2% of the sample identiﬁed as international migrants. The IPS survey
returns are inﬂated using weights to upscale to population numbers, with additional esti-
mates of asylum seekers and migrants between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, to
produce the Long Term International Migration (LTIM) estimates released by the ONS.
Issues related to UK migration statistics are documented elsewhere, for example, coverage
issues in the IPS owing to small sample sizes (Salt 2015) and debate around the inclusion
of students in the LTIM data (ONS 2017c).
We distinguish immigration and emigration ﬂows by 3 citizenships (British, European
Union and Non-European Union) and 12 UK regions giving 36 citizenship-UK region cat-
egories. Uncertainties surrounding these citizenship estimates are outlined in the sup-
plemental online material (SOM2), demonstrating that further disaggregation (e.g. by
more detailed citizenship) is not possible in our work due to small sample sizes in the
IPS. The IPS and LTIM data on international migration are used to make future assump-
tions about national immigration and emigration ﬂows by three citizenship groups.
These assumptions need to be converted into future assumptions by the local authority, eth-
nicity and age. The estimationmethod is explained in SOM2. To implement the conversion,
we employed estimated probabilities of ethnicity given citizenship, for the 12 UK regions.
These probabilities were derived from the 2011 Census Individual Microdata for England
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and Wales, grouping categories of the variables ‘passports held’ into the 3 citizenship
groups. Comparable data are not available for Scotland or Northern Ireland so we used
the probabilities for Wales, a region with similar low ethnic minority shares of the popu-
lation. A lookup of citizenship and region to ethnicity was calculated to create probabilities
of ethnicity given citizenship and region. These probabilities were applied to convert
migration ﬂows by region and citizenship for future years into ﬂows by region and ethnicity.
The UK region-ethnic group estimates and assumptions for immigration and emigra-
tion were allocated to local authority district (LAD) ethnic group-age-gender populations
using shares derived from 2011 Census aggregate tables for the population. The resulting
LAD immigration and emigration ﬂows were adjusted for the base year, 2010–11 to the
ONS estimates of total LAD immigration and emigration by age and sex. The immigration
estimates were checked against 2011 Census tables of immigrants by ethnicity and found
to be close across LADs. In all cases, we assumed the UK total and citizenship trends were
followed in each UK region, as regional shares had been stable over the 1991–2014 period.
Further details about international migration assumptions are provided in the supplemen-
tal online material (SOM2).
Projection assumptions for fertility, mortality and internal migration
Assumptions were set for each component for leading indicators for the long-term. The
long-term was deemed to start by 2019–2020. Short-term trends linked estimates for
2014 to the long-term constants.
These constant leading indicators are adopted from the ONS 2014-based National
Population Projections (NPP), principal variant. Assumptions set for the UK were con-
verted into LAD assumptions using the ratio of LAD values to the leading indicator for
the UK. For example, the ratio of LAD total fertility rate (TFR) to the UK TFR for
2011 is multiplied by the NPP assumption for TFR to 2061. For the long-term projection,
the TFR was assumed to be 1.89 children per woman. TFRs are apportioned to ages using
the ratios in the baseline 2011 estimates. The leading indicator used for mortality is the
rate of mortality decline of 1.2% per annum assumed in the NPP. This is based on the
average decline over the hundred years 1914–2014 and is applied to all ages and LADs.
Internal migration rates used a 2006–2011 average and were held constant for each
ethnic group-age-LAD group.
The projectionmodel allows for the emergence of mixed ethnic groups through the allo-
cation of ethnicity to a new-born infant. Births are generated to women of reproductive
age by multiplying the relevant population at risk by ethnicity and age by a forecast fer-
tility rate with the 2011 estimates are held constant to 2061. New-borns are allocated an
ethnicity using probabilities generated from the 2011 Census tables in which children
aged 0 at the 2011 Census (new-borns surviving the year prior to Census date) are
classiﬁed by their recorded ethnicity and that of their mother. The highest probabilities
are mostly found in the table diagonal (where the new-born has the same ethnicity as the
mother) but for some ethnicities (e.g. Black Caribbean or White Irish) many children are
allocated to groups other than the mother. This re-allocation is a major source of popu-
lation change for mixed ethnic groups. Information about changes in ethnicity of older
populations could be generated from the ONS Longitudinal Study but analysis showed
that the resulting probabilities were not robust (Simpson, Jivraj, and Warren 2016).
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International migration assumptions
We present four scenarios in this paper, under which the international migration assump-
tion is varied. The headline assumptions are laid out in Table 1. International migration
assumptions are set as future time series of immigration and emigration ﬂows separately.
This method for setting assumptions for international migration is judged to be the best of
several alternatives set out in Rees et al. (2015). In the No Brexit and Soft Brexit scenarios,
each citizenship-UK region category follows the national trend, while in the Hard Brexit
scenario, diﬀerent trends are developed for each citizenship category.
Figure 1 graphs assume headline immigration and emigration ﬂows under the three
scenarios in each year of the projection, with an increase or decrease to the required
level in 2031–32, after which the ﬂows are held constant. This use of constant migration
is consistent with methods used with national statistical agencies when projecting
migration and is the best choice when facing substantial uncertainty. Further discussion
about changing ethnic composition in the longer term is discussed in the supplemental
online material (SOM2). Assumptions for each of the scenarios were developed as follows.
For the No Brexit scenario, logistic models were ﬁtted to the UK total immigration and
emigration ﬂows for 1991–2014, extracted from tables in the IPS/LTIM. The logistic
asymptote levels were adopted as the long run immigration and emigration from 2019
to 20 onwards. These long-run ﬂows were allocated to 12 UK regions, converted to eth-
nicity and shared across 389 LADs as described above. Linear interpolation was used
for years between the base year and the year beyond which the long run assumption of
a ceiling was assumed constant.
For the Soft Brexit scenario, the long-term assumption for net international migration
in the 2014-based ONS National Population Projections of +185 thousand per year was
converted to immigration and emigration ﬂows using ratios for 2010–2011 reported in
the LTIM and adopted as long-run constant assumptions from 2019 to 2020. Our Soft
Brexit scenario assumes an overall reduction in migration compared to the No Brexit scen-
ario but does not specify diﬀerent assumptions for EU and non-EU migration. This is
because it represents a situation where the UK maintains a policy of free movement,
which is the current EU position if the UK wishes to retain access to the single market
(The Economist 2018) but nonetheless through a combination of factors becomes less
attractive to migrants. This scenario takes into account the fall in immigration since
June 2016 for EU following the referendum result (ONS 2017b), a trend which may con-
tinue post-Brexit.
For the Hard Brexit scenario, we linked immigration and emigration ﬂows to potential
future policy. Before the 2010 General Election, the Conservative Party included a pledge
Table 1. Summary of migration assumptions used in each projection scenario.
Scenario International migration assumption
No Brexit Net International Migration trended to = +252k in 2031–32, then constant. Annually, In = 621k,
Out = 362k
Soft Brexit Net International Migration trended to = +185k in 2031–32, then constant. Annually, In = 518k,
Out = 333k
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to reduce net international migration (NIM) to ‘tens of thousands’ (Sims 2016), inter-
preted here as a target ﬂoor of 100,000 net international migration. Between 2010 and
2014 the UK Coalition Government introduced stricter regulations and higher costs on
Non-EU immigrants. But this policy could not apply to EU citizens, under the
Freedom of Movement provisions in the Treaties establishing the European Union. The
consequences of the policy were a reduction in immigration from outside the EU,
which was counterbalanced by a substantial rise in the immigration of EU citizens after
2012 when economic recovery from the severe recession of 2009–2011 began. We argue
that following the 2016 Referendum, we could expect to see the previously observed
decline in Non-EU citizen immigration replicated in a decline for EU citizens thereafter.
After testing alternative extrapolative models and experimenting with diﬀerent calibration
intervals, a simple exponential model was calibrated for Non-EU citizens using the UK
immigration and emigration series for 2010–2014. The rates of decline were applied to
both Non-EU and EU citizens, with immigration and emigration by British citizens
assumed constant at 2010–14 levels. These assumptions determined the short-term
trends to a long-term limit of net international migration of 100,000 per year. The limit
was achieved in 2031–32 and assumed to continue to 2060–61.
Although this estimation process is dependent on many approximations, it delivers
plausible immigration and emigration estimates and conditional assumptions by ethnicity,
age and sex for LADs required for projecting LAD populations.
Deﬁnition of ethnic groups
Ethnic identity in the UK is based on self-identiﬁcation. In the census, a range of tick box
responses are oﬀered, as well as the option to provide a write in answer. In our projections,
we have identiﬁed 12 ethnic groups which are consistent across all census tables required
to produce UK projections. These are identiﬁed in Table 2 along with the abbreviations
used in subsequent ﬁgures. While there are more detailed ethnic group categories in
Figure 1. Illustration of international migration assumptions under three Brexit scenarios.
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some census tables, these are not consistently available, especially when combining data
for all the UK’s constituent countries. Table 2 also reports the size, average age and
total fertility rate of each ethnic group in 2011.
Figure 2 demonstrates the age structure of each of the ethnic groups in 2011. Age struc-
tures vary substantially between ethnic groups, for example, the White British and Irish
group and the Black Caribbean group have a high proportion of older people, while the
Mixed group has a large share of its population in younger age groups. These structures
immediately reveal that some groups are more susceptible to ageing if migration is
restricted and the information will be useful when interpreting the projection results in
the next section.
The categorisation of ethnicity is not without criticism. Finney and Simpson (2008, 65)
outline that, despite the emphasis on self-identiﬁcation, ‘the very asking of a question and
the construction of ethnic group categories assumes the importance of ethnic group for an
individual, and can be considered prescriptive’. Nor are the ethnic groups used in the UK
always comparable to those used elsewhere. For example, race is the term favoured by
researchers in the USA (see Frey 2015). The ethnic groups presented in this paper are
widely used in UK research and policy and represent the broadest number possible that
are consistent across all data sources used.
Results
The direct impact of migration
The direct impact of migration can be measured by summing up the total immigration
and emigration over a given period. Table 3 demonstrates the direct impact that
migration has over the projection period mid-2011 to mid-2061 for each ethnic
group. Across all three scenarios, the White British and Irish group have negative net
international migration, losing more people under the Soft Brexit scenario than under
the No Brexit scenario. The smallest loss for this group occurs under the Hard Brexit
scenario. This is largely due to the emigration assumptions used in each scenario,
Table 2. Ethnic Group deﬁnitions, 2011 populations (1000s), average ages and total fertility rates.
Ethnicity Census Response Groups Total Population Average Age Total Fertility Rate
Mid-2011 Mid-2011 2011
WBI White: British, Irish, Gypsy, Irish Traveller 52,462 41.4 1.83
WHO White: Other White 2714 33.2 2.06
MIX Mixed or Multiple Ethnic Groups 1251 21.8 1.49
IND Asian or Asian British: Indian 1455 34.1 2.20
PAK Asian or Asian British: Pakistani 1177 27.0 3.20
BAN Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi 453 25.5 3.47
CHI Asian or Asian British: Chinese 434 31.9 1.26
OAS Asian or Asian British: Other Asian 863 31.2 2.09
BLA Black or Black British: Black African 1024 27.5 2.64
BLC Black or Black British: Black Caribbean 602 38.7 1.75
BLO Black or Black British: Other Black 283 25.8 1.23
OTH Other Ethnic Group 581 30.3 1.77
ALL 63,299 39.5 1.93
Source: Authors’ computations from ONS Births, 2011 Census Data, Census Microdata and the Annual Population Survey.
Adapted from Rees et al. (2017).
Note: TFR Total Fertility Rate.
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where there are fewer emigrants under Hard Brexit, while, under Soft Brexit, emigration
is similar to No Brexit. The only other ethnicity to show net loss under the No Brexit and
Soft Brexit scenarios is the Black Caribbean group. This group shows a small gain under
the Hard Brexit scenario because immigration is higher and emigration lower than under
the other scenarios. The largest net gain under all scenarios is for the White Other group,
although this gain is 3.6 million lower under the Hard Brexit scenario compared with No
Brexit. It is likely that the White Other group will be heavily impacted by migration
policy arising from Brexit given that EU migrants are heavily represented within this
group. This cumulative migration forms one component of the projection scenarios, dis-
cussed in the next section.
Population projection results under four scenarios, 2011–2061
Measuring the total impact of migration reveals substantial diﬀerences in projected popu-
lations under the four scenarios. Figure 3 shows the total population in each year up to
Figure 2. The age and sex structure of each ethnic group in 2011.
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2061 under each of the four migration scenarios for the total UK population. The brown
line demonstrates the trajectory of growth under the No Brexit scenario. This scenario
shows continuous population growth throughout the projection period, with a population
in 2061 of 86.9 million. Under the Soft Brexit scenario (dashed blue line) the UK popu-
lation continues to grow, but at a slower rate than the No Brexit scenario, and the total
population in 2061 is projected to be 82.9 million. Under the Hard Brexit scenario
(dotted green line) population growth is slower, reaching 78.1 million in 2061. The No
International Migration scenario (dashed black line) is substantially diﬀerent from the
No Brexit scenario: population grows very slowly in early years and then begins to fall
after 2045. The result is a population of 65.7 million in 2061, only 1.9 million higher
Table 3. The direct eﬀect of international migration: cumulative immigration, emigration and net
migration for 2011–2061 by ethnic group.
Ethnicity No Brexit Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
Immig Emig Balance Immig Emig Balance Immig Emig Balance
WBI 6979 8633 −1655 5924 8009 −2085 4615 5,482 −867
WHO 11,242 4052 7189 9617 3764 5853 7857 3701 4156
MIX 884 480 404 761 446 315 599 381 218
IND 2584 835 1749 2211 776 1435 1397 755 642
PAK 1188 554 635 1026 515 511 689 399 290
BAN 293 256 37 253 238 16 245 168 76
CHI 2281 855 1425 1943 794 1149 868 402 465
OAS 2054 870 1185 1762 808 954 1275 668 607
BLA 1508 461 1046 1290 428 862 1295 692 603
BLC 196 333 −138 169 311 −142 211 177 34
BLO 181 129 52 156 120 36 173 113 60
OTH 1364 463 900 1163 429 734 849 433 416
ALL 30,754 17,922 12,831 26,277 16,638 9639 20,072 13,370 6702
Note: Immig = Immigration in 1000s, Emig = Emigration in 1000s, Balance = Net International Migration in 1000s = Immi-
gration – Emigration.
Figure 3. National Projections of total population under four migration scenarios.
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than the population in 2011. The decline seen in the No International Migration scenario
is because the population, which is predominantly White British and Irish, is ageing over
the period and deaths start to overtake births. Deaths increase because baby boomers, born
between 1946 and 1971 when the total fertility rate exceeded replacement, reach the ages
of high mortality risk between 2031 and 2061. There are substantial diﬀerences between
ethnic groups under these four scenarios, and these are discussed below.
When compared with the ONS variant projections for 2041 (the last year for variants in
the ONS data), our No Brexit and Soft Brexit are closest to the ONS high variant (77
million) while our Hard Brexit scenario is closest to the ONS Principal (72.9 million).
In 2061, our projection is higher than the ONS principal variant of 76.3 million. This is
largely due to diﬀerent long term migration and fertility assumptions laid out in the sup-
plementary material.
The shares of each ethnic group population at the end of the projection period under
the four migration scenarios are presented in Table 4, compared with values in 2011. The
White British–Irish population is the largest in 2011, representing 82.4% of total. This
share declines under every scenario, dropping to 57.9% of total population in 2061
under the No Brexit scenario. While the decline is smaller under other scenarios, no
matter which migration assumption is used the White British and Irish group is set to
decline in relation to all other groups combined. The largest gain in share under the No
Brexit, Soft and Hard Brexit scenarios is for the White Other population, which, from
4.5% of total UK population in 2011, increases its share to 12.9%, 11.8% and 10.0%
under the No Brexit, Soft Brexit and Hard Brexit scenarios respectively. The share of
the White Other group declines under the No International Migration scenario. The
impact on the share of total population of a Hard Brexit compared with a No Brexit scen-
ario are negative for most ethnic minority groups, notably Chinese (1.4% of the total
population compared with 2.6%). Indian (3.8% compared with 5.2%) and Other Asian
(2.5% compared with 3.1%).
Table 4 also reports the index of diversity (see the table notes) for the UK. An index of
zero represents no diversity (i.e. all people belong to a single ethnic group) while an index
of 0.92 represents complete diversity when there are 12 groups, where all groups are
equally represented. Under all scenarios, the UK population becomes more ethnically
diverse in 2061 than it was in 2011. It is most diverse under the No Brexit scenario
with a score of 0.64, which is double that of 2011 (0.32). The population is projected to
be least ethnically diverse in 2061 under the No International Migration scenario where
the score is 0.42, but this is still substantially higher than in 2011. This increase in diversity
across all scenarios is driven by the decline of the White British and Irish population and
by the increase in other ethnic group populations.
The projections by ethnic group can be split into four broad clusters (Figure 4), depend-
ing on their growth trajectories under the diﬀerent migration scenarios. Cluster 1 (noted as
C1 in Figure 4) comprises ﬁve groups which are very reliant upon international migration
to continue growing; Cluster 2 (C2) comprises two groups which are somewhat reliant on
international migration to grow; Cluster 3 (C3) comprises three groups which continue to
grow under all scenarios; and Cluster 4 (C4) comprises two ethnic groups where the popu-
lation is projected to decline under all scenarios. The graphs within this ﬁgure demonstrate
the demographic momentum of each ethnic group as the diﬀerence between the popu-
lation under each migration scenario and the No International Migration (natural increase
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only) projection, which serves to highlight how sensitive ethnic group populations are to
migration assumptions. Note that the scales for each graph are diﬀerent. Here we are inter-
ested in presenting the trajectory of growth or decline under each scenario, rather than the
absolute numbers, which are reported in Table 4.
C1 groups are those which are very reliant upon international migration to maintain
current growth levels. This is evident because, as the migration assumption becomes
more restrictive under diﬀerent Brexit scenarios, growth quickly slows. Under the No
International Migration scenario growth stalls and then becomes negative over the projec-
tion period. These are the groups with the lowest demographic momentum because they
decline quickly in the absence of migration. The White Other group are younger than
average at the start of the period (33.2 years compared with 39.5 years) but this population
is maintained largely by migration. While this group demonstrates the largest net inter-
national migration gain under the No Brexit scenario (see Table 3), the White Other
group also has very high immigration and emigration ﬂows, suggesting that the turnover
of population is maintaining younger age structures seen in the No Brexit scenario. This
group is hit particularly hard when immigration assumptions become more restrictive.
This is the group we project to grow the most under all three Brexit scenarios, because
of very high recent immigration. The diﬀerence in the size of the White Other group in
2061 between the No Brexit scenario and the No International Migration scenario is par-
ticularly stark: 11.2 million compared with 2.6 million.
The Indian group is the third oldest at the start of the period with an average age of 34.1
years. While fertility rates are relatively high (a TFR of 2.2), this is also a group where the
direct impact of migration is very high over the period. The Indian group exhibits the
second largest net migration gain after the White Other group under the No Brexit scen-
ario. The Chinese group exhibits the third largest net gain when assessing the direct impact
of migration. This group has the second lowest fertility of all groups (with a TFR of 1.26).
The Other Asian and Other groups also exhibit relatively high net gains under a No Brexit
scenario.
Table 4. The share of the UK population and the diversity index by ethnicity in 2011 and 2061 under
four migration scenarios.
2061 Population Scenario
Ethnicity 2011 Population No Brexit Soft Brexit Hard Brexit No International Migration
WBI 82.4 57.9 59.6 64.5 75.6
WHO 4.5 12.9 11.8 10 4
MIX 2 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.3
IND 2.4 5.2 5 3.8 2.7
PAK 1.9 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.6
BAN 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8
CHI 0.7 2.6 2.4 1.4 0.6
OAS 1.4 3.1 3 2.5 1.6
BLA 1.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 2.5
BLC 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
BLO 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6
OTH 0.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 0.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Total Pop. 63,743 86,902 82,883 78,087 65,659
Diversity 0.32 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.42
Note: Population shares are percentages of the total UK population. The total populations are in 1000s.
The Diversity Index is computed as1−∑e (Pe/P+)2, where Pe is the number of people in an ethnic group and P+ is the
total population.
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C2 ethnic groups are identiﬁed as being somewhat reliant upon international migration
to maintain their population growth, Black African and Black Other, which continue to
grow under all Brexit scenarios. There is a substantial slowdown in this growth under
the No International Migration scenario, but the populations continue to grow for
much of the period. Both groups have younger age structures at the beginning of the pro-
jection period. For the Black African group the average age is 27.5 years in 2011; for the
Black Other group, this is 25.8 years.
C3 groups are projected to continue growing under all migration scenarios and we con-
clude that these are groups with strong demographic momentum. All have relatively low
Figure 4. National projections of 12 ethnic group populations under four migration scenarios. Note: C1
= populations which are very reliant on international migration to continue growing; C2 = populations
somewhat reliant on international migration to continue growing; C3 = populations which continue to
grow under all migration scenarios; C4 = populations which decline under all scenarios.
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average ages at the start of the period (see Table 2). The Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups
have by far the highest fertility rates, with TFRs of 3.20 and 3.47 respectively. For these
groups, a combination of younger age structure and higher fertility results in continued
growth. The Mixed group has low fertility (TFR is 1.49) but is the youngest group so
has strong momentum carrying the population forward.
The two C4 ethnic group populations experience a lower population in 2061 than 2011
under all scenarios (White British and Irish) or most scenarios (Black Caribbean). The
White British and Irish group begin to decline rapidly from 2030 onwards. This is an
ageing population, the oldest of all ethnic groups with an average age of 41.4 in 2011.
Natural decrease begins to have an eﬀect after 20 years of the projection. Having No Inter-
national Migration slows this decline slightly in early years – the White British group has
seen net loss for decades, so stemming this has some eﬀect. The Black Caribbean group
exhibits net emigration under all except the Hard Brexit scenario. A large proportion of
the Black Caribbean group in the UK is made up of people who arrived in the 1950s
and 1960s to work, in response to post-war labour shortages and industrial prosperity
(Peach 1968, 1991). This is a group with a high average age at the beginning of the pro-
jection period (38.7 years, the second highest after White British and Irish) and thus one
which continues to age in place, so part of the population decline can be attributed to
deaths. The Black Caribbean group also has relatively low fertility rates, with a TFR of
1.75 at the beginning of the period. This combination characterises a group without the
demographic momentum to grow under any of the scenarios, with brief respite oﬀered
under a Hard Brexit scenario which has the eﬀect of reducing emigration.
Table 5 summarises the impact of net international migration on population change for
the 12 ethnic groups. The contribution percentages are computed using the cumulative net
international migration (NIM) balances of Table 3 expressed as a percentage of the total
population change for each Brexit scenario reported in columns two through four of Table
5. Subtracting the NIM contribution percentages from 100 yields the share of growth due
to natural increase. The NIM percentage is highest for the Black Caribbean, Other Ethnic,
White Other, Chinese and Other Asian, being above 50% under all scenarios. Aside from
Black Caribbean, these populations all belong to Cluster 1 (those very reliant on
migration). The NIM contribution is lowest for the Bangladeshi, Mixed and Pakistani
Table 5. The contribution of net international migration to population change under diﬀerent
scenarios.
Ethnicity Population Change (1000s) Contribution of Net International Migration (%)
No Brexit Soft Brexit Hard Brexit No Brexit Soft Brexit Hard Brexit
WBI −2183 −3042 −2055 76 69 42
WHO 8360 6827 4860 86 86 86
MIX 2982 2749 2390 14 11 9
IND 3017 2575 1420 58 56 45
PAK 3240 3020 2567 20 17 11
BAN 826 782 853 4 2 9
CHI 1827 1483 550 78 77 85
OAS 1839 1543 1065 64 62 57
BLA 2152 1894 1589 49 46 38
BLC −126 −139 20 109 102 170
BLO 234 208 226 22 17 27
OTH 991 800 433 91 92 96
ALL 23,159 18,698 13,918 55 52 48
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groups (between 9% and 11%) who are all members of Cluster 3, populations which
continue to grow under all scenarios. Overall (see the bottom row of Table 5) the NIM
contribution falls as the scenarios progress from No Brexit (55%), to Soft Brexit (52%)
to Hard Brexit (48%). This table serves to further highlight the substantial contribution
that international migration makes to population change for many groups. It is also reveal-
ing that, overall, NIM contributes more than half of total change under the No Brexit and
Soft Brexit scenarios but falls to a contribution of less than half under the No Brexit
scenario.
Population ageing under the three Brexit scenarios
A United Nations (2000) research report asked whether immigration could prevent
population ageing in developed countries. In that report and subsequent analyses for
European populations, Kupiszewski (2013) showed that, at best, population ageing
could be slowed a little in countries most attractive to immigrants. Prior to the June
2016 Referendum, the UK was such a country of attraction. In a projection analysis of
EU member states and regions, Rees et al. (2010) showed that by 2050 the UK would
have become the country with the highest population in the EU. As reversion to a No
Brexit scenario seems highly unlikely at the time of writing, it is improbable that the
UK will win the ‘European population championship’ in the next 50 years. Therefore, it
is of interest to examine the impacts of the diﬀerent scenarios on ageing for ethnic popu-
lations with very diﬀerent current age structures. In Table 6, we present one set of ageing
indicators for the UK’s ethnic populations which reports percentage distribution of the
population in three age bands, covering childhood, work and retirement. A threshold
age for entry into retirement of 70 is used. This anticipates planned increases in the age
threshold for payment of the state pension over the period 2011–2061. More reﬁned
thresholds have been proposed such as the ‘prospective’ age when 15 years of further
life can be expected (Sanderson and Scherbov 2010) or a threshold of 74 (Balachandran
et al. 2017). But a political consensus on such a high threshold does not (yet) exist in
the UK. By dividing the working ages percentage by the old age percentage, you obtain
the Potential Support Ratio (PSR), which gives an indication of the viability of the ‘Pay-
As-You-Go’ state pension system. The PSR statistics are given in columns seven and four-
teen of Table 6.
The White British and Irish majority experience a PSR shift from 4.8 working age
persons per older person in 2011–2.2 in 2061, irrespective of the migration scenario.
All other ethnic sub-populations except the Black Caribbean have much higher PSRs in
2011, reﬂecting their younger age structures. The Mixed, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other
Asian, Black African Black Other and Other ethnic groups all have a PSR of over 20 in
2011. By 2061 this diﬀerence between the White British and Irish and other groups in
PSR has transformed dramatically, irrespective of scenario, through a process of cohort
replacement. Under the Hard Brexit scenario, several groups most dependent on immigra-
tion for growth (White Other, Indian, Chinese, Other Asian, Black African, Black Carib-
bean, Other) reach PSRs which are below that of theWhite British and Irish group in 2011.
Over the period 2011–2061 the advantageous age structure (the demographic dividend) of
ethnic minority groups will wind down. All groups will face the challenge of an aged
society in the later decades of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
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Discussion and conclusions
This paper has focussed on reporting the eﬀects of alternative international migration
scenarios on the total population of the UK and the populations of its constituent
ethnic groups. The overall eﬀect of setting migration to zero in our reference scenario is
slow population growth which turns negative near the end of our projection period.
This contrasts with the projected increase under all three Brexit scenarios which demon-
strates how important is the role of international migration is for maintaining the UK
population. Population growth is strongest under the No Brexit scenario, followed by
the Soft Brexit scenario then Hard Brexit.
Under all migration scenarios, the overall share of the majority White British and Irish
population as a proportion of total population is projected to decline. This is most appar-
ent under the No Brexit Scenario but none of the more restrictive migration scenarios stop
this from happening. Under all scenarios, the UK population is projected to become more
ethnically diverse and the population structure shifts to one which is older. The migration
scenarios aﬀect the pace of ageing rather little for the White British majority but do have
signiﬁcant eﬀects for those ethnic minority groups dependent on international migration
for growth. In 2061 all groups will face the challenge of fewer persons of working age com-
pared with more persons in older ages.
Some groups are more reliant upon international migration to sustain their growth
than others. The White Other, Indian, Chinese, Other Asian and Other groups would
quickly decline if there were no international migration. The Mixed, Pakistani and Ban-
gladeshi ethnic minority groups will continue to grow, irrespective of which Brexit
migration scenario is used, because of their demographic potential and high fertility
rates. Running scenarios of international migration provide an understanding of which
groups (classiﬁed by ethnicity, age or locality) are aﬀected and which are not. Scenarios
can also reﬂect possible outcomes of policies about international migration (No Brexit,
Soft Brexit or Hard Brexit) and so inform decision making about future measures to
enable or discourage such migration ﬂows.
There are major uncertainties associated with these UK projections. The sequence No
Brexit to Hard Brexit provides a plausible range of outcomes but formally assigning
probabilities to the scenarios is beyond the scope of this paper. It is always the case
that new statistics are published which might point to a need for new scenarios.
Recent statistics on EU international migration into and out of the UK (ONS 2018a,
2018b, 2018c) have pointed to a downturn in immigration, which is built into the
Hard Brexit scenario. There was also a steep upturn in emigration, which we had not
anticipated. Part of this might be attributed to return migration, driven by the
growth of origin country economies. However, it might also be a sign that EU citizens
are voting with their feet following the referendum. The statistics show that they are not
coming to work in the UK in as large numbers and are leaving to work elsewhere in
larger numbers. This serves to highlight the diﬃculties of making assumptions about
future migration trends. We would caution the reader that what we present in this
paper are scenarios based on well-informed inputs. While we can’t validate results
from the projection, we can draw comparisons with the results of other models
which have broadly similar aims to our own.
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Table 6. Age indicators 2011 and 2061 by ethnicity under three migration scenarios.
Ethnicity Year Scenario % 0–19 % 20–69 % 70+ PSR Ethnicity Year Scenario % 0–19 % 20–69 % 70+ PSR
WBI 2011 Base pop 22.4 64.3 13.3 4.8 CHI 2011 Base pop 20.1 76.5 3.3 22.8
2061 No Brexit 22.9 53.7 23.3 2.2 2061 No Brexit 14.9 75.7 9.4 7.1
2061 Soft Brexit 22.7 53.7 23.6 2.2 2061 Soft Brexit 14.7 74.2 11.0 6.7
2061 Hard Brexit 20.8 55.4 23.8 2.2 2061 Hard Brexit 7.8 36.5 55.7 3.0
WHO 2011 Base pop 18.6 77.0 4.3 17.7 OAS 2011 Base pop 28.2 69.1 2.7 25.2
2061 No Brexit 12.8 72.2 15.0 4.5 2061 No Brexit 21.5 62.3 16.3 3.6
2061 Soft Brexit 12.7 70.5 16.8 4.0 2061 Soft Brexit 21.5 60.8 17.7 3.4
2061 Hard Brexit 10.7 42.7 46.6 3.2 2061 Hard Brexit 19.0 48.3 32.7 2.7
MIX 2011 Base pop 53.4 44.6 1.9 23.1 BLA 2011 Base pop 36.5 62.1 1.4 42.8
2061 No Brexit 35.5 56.7 7.7 7.0 2061 No Brexit 27.2 55.7 17.1 3.2
2061 Soft Brexit 34.8 57.1 8.1 6.9 2061 Soft Brexit 27.2 54.7 18.1 3.3
2061 Hard Brexit 28.7 59.6 11.7 6.4 2061 Hard Brexit 24.8 48.2 27.0 3.0
IND 2011 Base pop 24.0 70.6 5.4 13 BLC 2011 Base pop 22.8 66.7 10.5 6.4
2061 No Brexit 24.2 60.9 14.9 3.9 2061 No Brexit 25.1 43.8 31.0 1.4
2061 Soft Brexit 24.2 59.6 16.2 3.6 2061 Soft Brexit 24.7 43.7 31.7 1.5
2061 Hard Brexit 22.0 47.7 30.4 2.6 2061 Hard Brexit 19.7 50.8 29.5 1.9
PAK 2011 Base pop 39.3 57.5 3.1 18.3 BLO 2011 Base pop 44.7 53.2 2.1 25.0
2061 No Brexit 38.2 52.6 9.2 5.5 2061 No Brexit 25.0 59.1 15.9 3.6
2061 Soft Brexit 38.3 52.1 9.5 5.3 2061 Soft Brexit 24.6 58.8 16.6 3.6
2061 Hard Brexit 37.8 49.8 12.4 4.8 2061 Hard Brexit 19.6 59.1 21.3 3.6
BAN 2011 Base pop 41.5 55.9 2.7 21.0 OTH 2011 Base pop 29.4 67.7 2.9 23.2
2061 No Brexit 38.0 48.5 13.5 3.5 2061 No Brexit 14.1 66.4 19.5 3.2
2061 Soft Brexit 38.0 48.1 13.8 4.4 2061 Soft Brexit 13.8 64.7 21.5 3.0
2061 Hard Brexit 36.2 47.5 16.3 4.4 2061 Hard Brexit 9.6 46.4 44.0 2.3























Werpachowska and Werpachowski (2017)construct a dynamic micro-simulation
model for a sample of 5 million individuals classiﬁed by age, sex and ethnicity drawn
from decennial censuses and Labour force surveys, which is grossed up to the 56
million population in 2011 of England and Wales. The model incorporates probabilities
of international return migration to produce alternative scenarios for British and EU
citizen populations in England and Wales. The citizenship migration streams are con-
verted into ethnic group international migration. Although an exact comparison of
methods and assumptions with our results is not possible, the direction of travel of the
total populations and ethnic groups are broadly similar. Their Status Quo projection
corresponds with our No Brexit scenario and their Hard Brexit projection corresponds
with our Hard Brexit scenario. However, their Soft Brexit scenario generates results
very close to their Hard Brexit scenario, while our Soft Brexit scenario projects higher
populations.
This paper has focussed on the national results of our scenario projections. In further
work, we intend to analyse the local implications of our results and the process of popu-
lation ageing deserves further analysis, drawing on these projections. We have not built in
future changes in marrying or partnering outside one’s group. Further research is required
to develop these assumptions as they will have implications for the composition of popu-
lation especially of the mixed ethnic group. The paper has concentrated on the UK’s
demographic futures which have signiﬁcant implications for the labour force and
economy. Addition of a labour force participation analysis would be very valuable, match-
ing the country level research of Kupiszewski (2013) and Loichinger (2015).
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